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The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed over fifty years ago.1
Since that time, legislative updates, judicial rulings, evolving cultural
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1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
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and societal attitudes, and executive actions, as well as coordinated
efforts by advocates, have operated to shape and refine the contours
of the Act. The law continues to develop, for example, the scope of
its prohibition on sex discrimination in employment.2 The reach of
this protection has seen notable expansion including the legislative
addition of pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination
in 1978,3 the 1989 judicial determination that sex-stereotyping is a
form of sex discrimination,4 and the decisions from the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) first, in 2012, that sex
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act includes dis-
crimination on the basis of gender identity,5 and, three years later,
that it covers sexual orientation discrimination as well.6
While the EEOC decisions were significant, they were not unique.
In fact, they mirrored other recent expansions in, and concomitant
increased recognition of, the need for protections for the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community.7
Yet even while the movement for LGBT rights has seen notable
successes and increased protections,8 there remain concurrent ef-
forts—some with renewed vigor in the wake of the recent marriage
equality decision9—to restrict rights and allow discrimination against
LGBT individuals. In a majority of states, for example, it remains
legal to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation or gender
identity in employment, housing, and public accommodations.10
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. 7.
3. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)); see infra Part II.C.
4. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see infra Part I.B.
5. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
6. Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080 (EEOC July 15, 2015); U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ADDRESSING SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY DISCRIMI-
NATION IN FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT: A GUIDE TO EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS, PROTEC-
TIONS, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (June 2015), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight
/diversity-and-inclusion/reference-materials/addressing-sexual-orientation-and-gender
-identity-discrimination-in-federal-civilian-employment.pdf [http://perma.cc/6FCD-GBHP].
7. The LGBT community is a diverse and non-monolithic community; however, for
the purposes of this Article, protections to the communities will be considered as a whole,
except where there are explicit distinctions or differences. The overarching term for this
community is sometimes referenced as LGBTQ, where ‘Q’ represents queer or question-
ing. For example, where policies or advocacy did not include efforts on behalf of the trans-
gender community, we will reference the LGB (lesbian, gay, and bisexual) community.
8. See infra Part I.B.; see also Know Your Rights: The Laws That Protect You,
LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/workplace/laws-that-pro
tect-you#Q2 [http://perma.cc/WCR4-PYZM].
9. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
10. See Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information—Map, ACLU, https://
www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited
Nov. 4, 2015).
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From the Stonewall riots of 1969,11 and ACT UP’s founding in
1987,12 to the ultimate victory in the fight for marriage equality in
2015,13 the LGBT community has become increasingly visible and
organized in its efforts to exercise its political voice.14 “In a relatively
short period of time, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
(LGBT) movement has moved from the margins to the center.” 15
Beginning in 1974, the fight for federal civil rights protections
became one focus of these efforts. With the introduction of the Equality
Act,16 LGBT rights advocates sought to ensure the same civil right
protections afforded other disadvantaged groups by amending the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sexual orientation as a protected
class.17 In 1994, after two decades of efforts to achieve these protec-
tions, with growing momentum but still no legislative success, LGBT
advocates, for both practical and strategic reasons, changed their
approach to gaining federal protections by introducing a separate,
standalone bill protecting against sexual orientation discrimination
in the employment context—the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act (ENDA).18
11. Ken Harlin, The Stonewall Riot and Its Aftermath, STONEWALL AND BEYOND: LES-
BIAN AND GAY CULTURE, http://www.columbia.edu/cu/lweb/eresources/exhibitions/sw25
/case1.html [http://perma.cc/Y8B3-RDET] (last updated Aug. 24, 2011); see also Stonewall
Riots: The Beginning of the LGBT Movement, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (June 22,
2009), http://www.civilrights.org/archives/2009/06/449-stonewall.html [http://perma.cc
/THG9-GZNJ].
12. ACTUP Capsule History 1987, ACT UP, http://www.actupny.org/documents/cron
-87.html [http://perma.cc/KF95-QUJZ].
13. See Gwendolyn M. Leachman, From Protest to Perry: How Litigation Shaped the
LGBT Movement’s Agenda, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1667, 1678–80 (2014) (discussing the
history of the LGBT movement and marriage equality’s emergence a a priority issue
beginning in the 1980s and a central issue through the 1990s and 2000s).
14. See Luisita Lopez Torregrosa, The Face of the Gay Rights Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.  30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/01iht-letter01.html?_r=0 [http://
perma.cc/UNE6-HJ8L] (identifying political victories and broadening recognition and
support for the LGBT community, but noting concerns about the role of women in the
movement). For a list of key historical milestones in the gay rights movement, see, e.g.,
Key Moments in LGBT Rights History, MSN NEWS (June 26, 2015), http://www.msn.com
/en-us/news/us/key-moments-in-lgbt-rights-history/ss-BBjXpV6#image=1 [http://perma
.cc/D7TW-J8VX].
15. Douglas NeJaime et al., On the Cutting Edge: Charting the Future of Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity Scholarship, 19 LAW & SEXUALITY 181 (2010).
16. H.R. 14,752, 93d Cong. (1974).
17. See, e.g., Alex Reed, Abandoning ENDA, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 277, 281–82 (2014);
see also H.R. 15,692, 93d Cong. (1974) (proposing the addition of marital status and sexual
orientation as protected classes under the Civil Rights Act, as well as the inclusion of sex
discrimination in Titles II, III, and VI, which prohibit discrimination in public accom-
modations, public facilities, and federally assisted programs, respectively, in addition to
Title VII).
18. See infra Part I.B.; see also William C. Sung, Note, Taking the Fight Back to Title
VII: A Case for Redefining “Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual
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However, after twenty years of fighting for passage of ENDA,
in the face of changes in the bill’s coverage, the political climate, and
the Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Supreme Court decision,19 LGBT advo-
cates again changed course in 2014, withdrawing support for ENDA
and instead demanding comprehensive civil rights protections in con-
texts beyond just employment.20
In a bit of deja vu, on July 23, 2015, forty-one years after the first
Equality Act was introduced, the Equality Act of 2015—a bill amend-
ing the Civil Rights Act of 1964—was introduced in the Senate by
Senator Jeff Merkley (D-OR), and concurrently in the House by
Representative David Cicilline (D-RI).21 Similar to the 1974 bill, the
Equality Act amends the 1964 Act to include sexual orientation as
a protected class.22 Going beyond the 1974 bill, the 2015 Act also in-
cludes protections based on gender identity and incorporates sexual
orientation and gender identity into the definition of sex.23
In light of the introduction of the Equality Act, particularly in
the context of an abandoned ENDA legislative campaign, a success-
ful marriage equality judicial strategy, and an increase in protections
extended by federal agencies, this Article will consider the opportu-
nities and challenges facing the LGBT community in its fight for
federal civil rights legislation.
Part I will briefly discuss the storied history of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the existing and proposed federal civil rights pro-
tections for the LGBT community. Part II will examine potential
approaches for achieving LGBT anti-discrimination protections by
considering historical examples of civil rights protections.
The Article will conclude with an evaluation of the strengths
and weaknesses of each of these approaches in achieving federal
civil rights protections for the LGBT community.
I. THE FIGHT FOR FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964: The Archetype for Civil
Rights Protections
In August of 1963, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., stood
atop the steps of the Lincoln Memorial at the historic March on
Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 495–514 (2011) (providing a
comprehensive overview of the legislative and political history of ENDA).
19. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (expanding the con-
cept of “religious freedom” to extend to for-profit corporations).
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015).
22. S. 1858; H.R. 3185.
23. See S. 1858, § 2(1).
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Washington for Jobs and Freedom in Washington, D.C., and deliv-
ered his “I Have a Dream” speech to more than 200,000 Ameri-
cans,24 declaring, “[n]ow is the time to make real the promises of
democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley
of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice.” 25 Less than three
months later, and just days after the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson addressed a joint ses-
sion of Congress: “We have talked long enough in this country about
equal rights. We have talked for 100 years or more. It is time now
to write the next chapter—and to write it in the books of law.” 26
On July 2, 1964, after a long and hard fought public and legisla-
tive battle, as a direct result of the civil rights movement,27 and as
a tribute to the memory of President Kennedy,28 Reverend King joined
President Johnson in the oval office as he signed the most sweeping
civil rights bill in the nation’s history, the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29
The Civil Rights Act comprises eleven titles, or areas of protec-
tion, and outlawed discrimination in public accommodations (Title
II), public facilities (Title III), public education (Title IV), programs
that receive federal funding (Title VI), and employment (Title VII).30
In all of these, it provides protection against discrimination based on
race, color, or national origin, with some titles also protecting against
discrimination based on sex or religion.31 The Civil Rights Act also
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to review employment discrimination complaints.32
Since its passage in 1964, the Civil Rights Act has been amended
only a few times. The major amendments relate to sex discrimination
24. Civil Rights Movement: The March on Washington and the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, http://www.jfklibrary.org/JFK/JFK
-in-History/Civil-Rights-Movement.aspx?p=3 [http://perma.cc/7AN6-4QBV].
25. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream (Aug. 28, 1963), http://www.archives
.gov/press/exhibits/dream-speech.pdf [http://perma.cc/3RUG-FH88].
26. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (Nov. 27,
1963), http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/JointSession1963.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8EC8-MNUG].
27. JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY & MUSEUM, supra note 24.
28. Landmark Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL
OFFICE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAct1964
.htm [http://perma.cc/BCS6-TQN4].
29. Id. This landmark civil rights bill also paved the way for two other vaunted civil
rights laws: the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968. See Mae
Bowen, This Day in History: President Lyndon B. Johnson Signed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 2, 2015, 3:29 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog
/2015/07/02/day-history-president-lyndon-b-johnson-signed-civil-rights-act-1964 [http://
perma.cc/W589-8QU8].
30. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 2, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
31. See id. at 254.
32. Id. at 241; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(a)(1) (2012).
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in Title VII,33 and, perhaps because of the late timing and questionable
motivation around its addition, there is a lack of legislative history
“to guide [courts] in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against dis-
crimination based on ‘sex.’ ” 34 It is well-known lore that one day before
the House of Representatives was set to vote on the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Representative Howard Smith (D-VA) introduced a floor
amendment adding “sex” to the prohibited bases for employee dis-
crimination in Title VII, in an effort to kill the landmark civil rights
bill prohibiting racial discrimination, or at the very least in an effort
to “protect” white women .35 Ultimately, the putative attempt to kill
the bill failed, Title VII passed with the sex provision included, and
women won protection against sex-based employment discrimina-
tion, with little discussion or consideration.36 Thus, while Title VII
makes it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex,” 37
this protection was barely considered during the legislative process,
which has led to the need for judicial interpretation, and often to sub-
sequent countervailing legislative enactments.38
The most important procedural amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, made under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, granted the EEOC the authority to bring Title VII lawsuits,
rather than simply rely on cease-and-desist powers or a system of
private enforcement.39 The next major amendments to the Civil Rights
Act, and Title VII in particular, all overturned controversial Supreme
Court cases. In order to overturn the Court’s decisions in Geduldig
v. Aiello and Gilbert v. General Electric Co., which together held that
pregnancy discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination,40 The
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) amended the definition
33. See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text.
34. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); see Jason Lee, Note, Lost in
Transition: The Challenges of Remedying Transgender Employment Discrimination Under
Title VII, 35 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 423, 429–30 (2012).
35. Lee, supra note 34, at 429–30. There is, however, disagreement with this view.
See, e.g., Jo Freeman, How “Sex” Got Into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker
of Public Policy, JOFREEMAN.COM, http://www.jofreeman.com/lawandpolicy/titlevii.htm
[http://perma.cc/VW83-Y6ZP]; Louis Menand, The Sex Amendment: How Women got in
on the Civil Rights Act, THE NEW YORKER (July 21, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2014/07/21/sex-amendment [http://perma.cc/ZM36-DF5P].
36. Lee, supra note 34, at 430.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012).
38. See Lee, supra note 34, at 425–27.
39. Elinor P. Schroeder, Title VII at 40: A Look Back, J. KAN. B. ASS’N 18, 22
(Nov./Dec. 2004).
40. Schroeder, supra note 39, at 22; see also Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA,
a Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 209, 211 (2008).
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of sex discrimination in Title VII to include “pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions.” 41 Congress also amended the Civil
Rights Act in 1991 in response to several Supreme Court decisions
that interpreted Title VII narrowly,42 most notably rejecting the
Court’s decisions in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, which made
it considerably more difficult to prove disparate impact claims
under Title VII,43 and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, which limited
mixed-motive claims.44 The most recent amendments to Title VII oc-
curred in 2009, when Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act in response to a Supreme Court decision limiting the ability of
women to bring pay discrimination cases.45
These cases, and the legislative amendments passed to overturn
them, indicate the complications inherent in the interplay between
legislative drafting, legislative intent, and legal interpretation.
B. Baby Steps: Burgeoning Federal Civil Rights Protections for
LGBT Individuals
While the protections under Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrim-
ination were expanding, laws and policies attempting to restrict the
rights of LGBT individuals flourished. From state laws and policies
including sodomy bans, such as those at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick
and Lawrence v. Texas,46 attempts to enforce unconstitutional sodomy
bans,47 marriage bans,48 and the current proliferation of “religious 
41. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
42. Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, And the
Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and A Dog That Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1093, 1102 (1993).
43. Id. at 1133.
44. Id. at 1151–53.
45. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009); Supreme
Court Preview, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.nwlc.org/resource/su
preme-court-preview [http://perma.cc/2SGU-SX3M]; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 644 (2007) (dismissing a pay discrimination case for failure
to comply with Title VII’s requirement that a plaintiff file a discrimination charge against
an employer within “[180] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred”
and holding that a new statute of limitations is not triggered with each individual paycheck
received after the initial limitations period has lapsed (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1))).
46. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003).
47. See, e.g., Carlos Maza, State Sodomy Laws Continue To Target LGBT Americans,
EQUALITY MATTERS (Aug. 8, 2011, 3:26 PM), http://equalitymatters.org/blog/20110808
0012 [http://perma.cc/W9U8-P9PG].
48. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Backlash Politics: How Constitutional Litigation
Has Advanced Marriage Equality in the United States, 93 B.U. L. REV. 275, 292–99,
301–02 (2013) (providing a history of the backlash in response to state supreme courts 
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freedom” bills,49 to federal restrictions like Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell
(DADT) and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), and even efforts
to pass a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage,50 the LGBT
community has faced direct and specific discriminatory policies.
Yet in the face of these extensive anti-LGBT initiatives, some
states began to recognize protections, spurred by well-organized and
coordinated LGBT advocacy efforts,51 both in terms of marriage
equality,52 and anti-discrimination protections.53 At the same time,
incipient federal efforts aimed at ensuring equal treatment for
LGBT individuals were developing. This Article will focus on these
federal initiatives.
recognizing same-sex marriage in Hawaii in 1993 and Massachusetts between 2003 and
2004).
49. See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35, 94–100 (2015) (describing sexual orientation
discrimination as “highly likely to present the next cutting edge of RFRA claims by both
religious nonprofits and for-profit companies”); see also MARCI A. HAMILTON, The Never-
Ending Spiral of Extreme Religious Liberty, in GOD VS. THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF
EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 340, 340–42 (2d ed. 2014) (detailing the gradual lowering
of standards for claiming “religious freedom” as a defense); Rick Ungar, Understanding
Why Indiana’s RFRA Clears The Way To Discriminating Against LGBT Americans,
FORBES (Mar. 30, 2015, 12:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2015/03/30/un
derstanding-why-indianas-rfra-clears-the-way-to-discriminating-against-lgbt-americans
[http://perma.cc/NFU7-PLY2] (describing the expansion of religious freedom bills from
the original federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act to state bills that afford private
entities the defense of religious freedom in private suits).
50. See Jonathan Capehart, Gays and Lesbians Owe Thanks to President George W.
Bush and Justice Scalia, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/10/20/gays-and-lesbians-owe-thanks-to-president-george-w
-bush-and-justice-scalia [http://perma.cc/E54A-75QX] (stating that “[i]n February 2004,
[George W.] Bush called for a constitutional amendment against gay marriage that
would have etched discrimination into our nation’s most sacred document. Then, thanks
to a Bush-backed effort . . . [in November 2004] voters in 11 states approved ballot
initiatives that banned committed same-sex couples from marrying.”).
51. See, e.g., MacArthur Fellows Program: Mary L. Bonauto, MACARTHUR FOUNDA-
TION (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.macfound.org/fellows/909 [http://perma.cc/LZ7K-M7V3]
(describing how “Bonauto led a team from GLAD and private law firms in the first
strategic challenge to . . . the federal Defense Against Marriage Act (DOMA) . . . .”).
52. See Danielle Kurtzleben, Map: Here’s How Same-Sex Marriage Laws Will Now
Change Nationwide, NPR (June 26, 2015, 10:39 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/its
allpolitics/2015/06/26/417715124/map-heres-how-same-sex-marriage-laws-will-now
-change-nationwide [http://perma.cc/S6ZZ-7KDH] (demonstrating the status of same-sex
marriage laws in states before and after Obergefell v. Hodges, and distinguishing be-
tween protections granted by state action, previous lower federal court decisions, and the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell).
53. See Jerome Hunt, A State-by-State Examination of Nondiscrimination Laws and
Policies: State Nondiscrimination Policies Fill the Void but Federal Protections Are Still
Needed, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND (June 2012), https://www.american
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/06/pdf/state_nondiscrimination.pdf 
(“Where Congress has failed to act, states have stepped in to provide employment pro-
tections to the gay and transgender workforce.”).
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1. Executive Protections
The Clinton administration created some important policies,
programs and protections for the LGB community, many related to
sexual orientation and people living with HIV or AIDS.54 In 1995,
President Clinton signed an Executive Order that prohibited discrimi-
nation on the basis of sexual orientation in granting security clear-
ances.55 In 1998, President Clinton signed another Executive Order,
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in the federal
civilian workforce.56
Following President George W. Bush’s White House, which op-
posed LGBT protections,57 the Obama administration has taken a
number of actions to expand protections for LGBT individuals.58 At
the beginning of his presidency, Obama directed all federal agencies
to extend benefits to same-sex partners of federal employees,59 and
ordered the Health and Human Services Administration to issue
regulations prohibiting LGBT discrimination in hospitals that receive
Medicaid or Medicare funds.60 The Administration had a role in the
repeal of DADT in 2010, which lifted the ban on lesbian, gay, and bi-
sexual service members,61 and in July of 2015, the Department of
54. See Clinton-Gore Administration: A Record of Progress for Gay and Lesbian Ameri-
cans, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/Accomplishments
/ac399.html [http://perma.cc/LS6H-6WQR] (providing a comprehensive list of actions
taken by the Clinton administration to improve the lives of LGBT Americans). But cf.
Peter Baker, Now in Defense of Gay Marriage, Bill Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/us/politics/bill-clintons-decision-and-regret-on
-defense-of-marriage-act.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/35NH-ZMYA] (detailing President
Clinton’s signing of the Defense of Marriage Act, and his subsequent regret and disavowal
of that position).
55. Exec. Order No. 12,968, 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245 (Aug. 2, 1995).
56. Exec. Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (May 28, 1998).
57. See Capehart, supra note 50.
58. See Strengthening Protection Against Discrimination, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/issues/civil-rights/discrimination [http://perma.cc/5SKQ-67G5];
Obama Administration Record for the LGBT Community, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/lgbt_record.pdf [http://perma.cc/L9GU-J6VG];
Obama Administration Policy Advancements on behalf of LGBT Americans, HUMAN
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/obama-administration-policy-legis
lative-and-other-advancements-on-behalf-of [http://perma.cc/3Q4C-F6Z7] (providing a
comprehensive list of executive branch actions and policies that advance LGBT rights).
59. Extension of Benefits to Same-Sex Domestic Partners of Federal Employees, 75
Fed. Reg. 32,247 (June 2, 2010).
60. Respecting the Rights of Hospital Patients to Receive Visitors and to Designate
Surrogate Decision Makers for Medical Emergencies, 75 Fed. Reg. 20,511 (Apr. 15, 2010)
(to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 482.13, 489.102(a)).
61. See Progress Where You Might Least Expect It: The Military’s Repeal of “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell,” 127 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1801–02 (2014) (describing the passage of the
DADT Repeal Act as spurred by successful litigation and an extensive study conducted
by the Obama administration). See infra notes 108–12 for a discussion of DADT.
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Defense signaled that transgender individuals will soon be able to
serve openly in the military as well.62
Importantly, President Obama issued Executive Order 13,672,
which amended the existing Civil Rights Executive Order 11,246,63
and explicitly protected federal employees and employees of federal
contractors from sexual orientation and gender identity discrimi-
nation.64 The Obama administration has also advanced pro-LGBT
policies, especially related to gender identity, in veterans’ health,65
policing and law enforcement,66 and housing, noting that under the
Fair Housing Act prohibition on sex discrimination, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development has the authority “to pursue
complaints from LGBT persons alleging housing discrimination be-
cause of non-conformity with gender stereotypes.” 67
Most notably, the administration’s chief enforcer of employ-
ment protections, the EEOC, has taken affirmative steps to provide
employment protections and remedies to the LGBT community,
even making it a top priority in its 2012 Strategic Enforcement
Plan.68 In addition to providing guidance on LGBT employment
62. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Statement by Secretary of Defense Ash Carter
on DOD Transgender Policy (July 13, 2015), http://www.defense.gov/Releases/Release
.aspx?ReleaseID=17378 [http://perma.cc/77LP-PAFC] (announcing the future lift of the
ban, pending a six month study on the effects of lifting the ban, but presuming there will
be no adverse effects identified); see also Tom Vanden Brook, Military Transgender Ban
Set To End Next May, USA TODAY (Aug. 25, 2015, 6:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/nation/2015/08/25/military-transgender-ban-set-end-next-may/32345385)
[http://perma.cc/VM3U-M4UA].
63. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sep. 24, 1965).
64. Exec. Order No. 13,672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014).
65. See U.S. DEP ’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VHA DIRECTIVE 2013-003, PROVIDING
HEALTH CARE FOR TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX VETERANS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.va
.gov/vhapublications/ViewPublication.asp?pub_ID=2863 [http://perma.cc/TG68-2HGY].
66. See U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER, NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL
ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag
/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-race-policy.pdf [http://perma.cc/LM7Z-VNXR]; see
also Dep. Attorney Gen. James M. Cole, Remarks at the Community Relations Service
Transgender Law Enforcement Training Launch (Mar. 27, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-delivers-re
marks-community-relations-service) [http://perma.cc/LZA7-9WSU] (announcing the launch
of a training program for law enforcement interaction with transgender individuals).
67. Kenneth J. Carroll, HUD Addresses LGBT Housing Discrimination, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Oct. 13, 2011, 11:01 AM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/10/13/hud-ad
dresses-lgbt-housing-discrimination [http://perma.cc/8DHB-FU6M].
68. U.S. EQUAL EMP ’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT PLAN: FY
2013–2016 (2012), http://www.eeoc/gov/eeoc/plan/sep.cfm [http://perma.cc/LH32-5WVJ]
(recognizing the need to calibrate the nature of coverage extended to “lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender individuals under Title VII’s sex discrimination provisions, as they may
apply” in its section on “Addressing Emerging and Developing Issues”).
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protections,69 the EEOC has recognized that both the sex-stereotyping
and per se discrimination approaches apply to discrimination claims
based on sexual orientation or gender identity under Title VII’s sex
discrimination provision.70 The Department of Justice has also ex-
plicitly endorsed the application of Title VII’s sex discrimination pro-
vision to gender identity discrimination, but has not yet addressed
its application to sexual orientation discrimination.71
These decisions mark an important step in the movement towards
LGBT civil rights protections, as they are binding on all federal
agencies and departments,72 and may be given deference by federal
courts.73 Yet these decisions are limited to the employment context.
Even after these determinations, it is still legal to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in many areas of
federal law.74 Similarly, it is still legal to discriminate on the basis
of sexual orientation or gender identity under state law in employ-
ment, housing, and public accommodations in a majority of states.75
69. See OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., Addressing Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity Discrimination in Federal Civilian Employment: A Guide to Employment Rights,
Protections, and Responsibilities (June 2015), https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-over sight
/diversity-and-inclusion/reference-materials/addressing-sexual-orientation-and-gender-iden
tity-discrimination-in-federal-civilian-employment.pdf [http://perma.cc/5MQD-NNMB].
70. EEOC v. Lakeland Eye Clinic, P.A. (M.D. Fla. Civ. No. 8:14-cv-02421-T35 AEP filed
Sept. 25, 2014); EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. (E.D. Mich. Civ. No. 2:14-
cv-13710-SFC-DRG filed Sept. 25, 2014) (gender identity under both sex-stereotyping
and per se approaches); Veretto v. Dohahoe, Appeal No. 0120110873 (EEOC July 1,
2015) (sexual orientation sex-stereotyping); Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821
(EEOC Apr. 20, 2012) (gender identity per se); Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No, 0120133080
(EEOC July 15, 2015) (sexual orientation per se).
71. Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to U.S. Attorneys and Heads of
Dep’t Components, Treatment of Transgender Employment Discrimination Claims Under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/file
/188671/download [http://perma.cc/C4GF-32RT].
72. See Laura Anne Taylor, Note, A Win for Transgender Employees: Chevron Defer-
ence for the EEOC’s Decision in Macy v. Holder, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1165, 1190 (2013).
73. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45
(1984) (holding that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”). But see Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to
EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a
Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1534 (1999) (arguing that “under the Civil
Rights Act, Congress did not grant the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules with the
force of law. . . . [T]he standard of deference for EEOC guidelines is undefined.”) (internal
footnote omitted), and Jeremy Greenberg, Not a “Second Class” Agency: Applying Chevron
Step Zero to EEOC Interpretations of the ADA and ADAAA, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
297, 298 (2014).
74. Why the Equality Act?, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources
/entry/why-the-equality-act [http://perma.cc/Z2SY-GY2L].
75. See supra note 10.
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2. Judicial Protections
Judicial advances have been among the most significant and
public victories for the LGBT community. In one of its early cases
expanding rights for the LGBT community, Romer v. Evans, the Su-
preme Court recognized protections for LGBT individuals under the
Equal Protection Clause.76 In 2003, the Court, recognizing that the
petitioners were “entitled to respect for their private lives,” decrimi-
nalized sodomy and, by extension, homosexuality in Lawrence v.
Texas, overturning nearly two decades of Supreme Court precedent.77
In the context of a growing number of state and lower federal
court decisions on marriage equality, most of them granting the right
to marry to same-sex couples,78 the Court struck down the provision
defining marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act, which limited mar-
riage to opposite-sex couples,79 and ended the exclusion of LGBT
couples from federal benefits in United States v. Windsor.80 Two years
later, in its landmark 2015 decision Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court
struck down state laws banning same-sex marriage, thereby grant-
ing the fundamental right to marry to all Americans regardless of
their sexual orientation or gender identity.81 As stated in Justice
Kennedy’s soaring opinion:
No union is more profound than marriage . . . . It would misunder-
stand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of mar-
riage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply
that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves . . . . They ask
for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants
them that right.82
In the context of shifting cultural attitudes toward LGBT people, each
of these cases has built upon the language, themes, and holdings of
76. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (striking down a state Amendment
that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect LGBT in-
dividuals from discrimination as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
77. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
78. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608–10 (2015) (listing, in Appendix
A, the state and federal court decisions addressing marriage equality).
79. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who
is a husband or a wife.”).
80. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694–96 (2013).
81. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
82. Id.
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the preceding cases to drastically alter the nation’s constitutional
and societal landscape for the LGBT community.83
Similar advances and shifting legal landscapes can be seen in the
employment discrimination context. Although LGBT plaintiffs began
challenging employment discrimination in the 1970s, using Title
VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, these early cases were un-
successful, usually due to the court’s narrow interpretation of the term
“sex.” 84 However, the 1989 landmark case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
significantly altered the ability of LGBT plaintiffs to bring success-
ful claims, and the LGBT community has seen greater success more
recently.85 In Price Waterhouse, the Court established that the pro-
hibition on sex discrimination includes discrimination based on sex
stereotypes and gender conformity.86 Because discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is often directly related
to sex stereotypes and gender norms,87 LGBT plaintiffs, particularly
transgender plaintiffs, have had increasing success bringing discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII.88 And the prospects for success among
LGBT plaintiffs under Title VII improved further after the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., which
held that sexual harassment by a person of the same sex is action-
able under Title VII.89 As the EEOC explained in Baldwin v. Foxx:
Congress may not have envisioned the application of Title VII to
these situations. But as a unanimous Court stated in Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., “statutory prohibitions often
go beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover
reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions
83. See Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law
as a Vehicle for Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351, 355–57 (2013).
84. Stephanie Rotondo, Employment Discrimination Against LGBT Persons, 16 GEO.
J. GENDER & L. 103, 107, 129 (2015); see, e.g., DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327, 329–30 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that applying the plain meaning of “sex” demon-
strates Congressional intent to protect only “traditional notions” of gender, and excludes
“sexual preference such as homosexuality”).
85. Rotondo, supra note 84, at 107–09; see also Lee, supra note 34, at 426–27.
86. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (“[W]e are beyond the day
when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched
the stereotype associated with their group . . . . An employer who objects to aggres-
siveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if
they do not. Title VII lifts women out of this bind.”).
87. See Howell v. N. Cent. Coll., 320 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (“Stereo-
typical notions about how men and women should behave will often necessarily blur into
ideas about heterosexuality and homosexuality.”).
88. See Rotondo, supra note 84, at 110–11.
89. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators
by which we are governed.” 523 U.S. 75, 79, 78–80 (1998) . . . .
Interpreting the sex discrimination prohibition of Title VII to ex-
clude coverage of lesbian, gay or bisexual individuals who have
experienced discrimination on the basis of sex inserts a limita-
tion into the text that Congress has not included. Nothing in the
text of Title VII “suggests that Congress intended to confine the
benefits of [the] statute to heterosexual employees alone.” Heller
v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d. 1212, 1222
(D. Or. 2002).90
The jurisprudence around employment protections for the LGBT
community, under Title VII’s sex discrimination provision, has devel-
oped under two distinct, yet often linked, approaches. Courts have
not only protected gender identity under the Price Waterhouse sex-
stereotyping theory,91 but have also held, consistent with the posi-
tion of the EEOC92 and the Department of Justice,93 that gender
identity discrimination constitutes per se sex discrimination.94 This
approach holds that discrimination based on an employee’s change
in sex is literally discrimination “because of . . . sex,” similar to the
way discrimination based on an employee’s change of religion would
universally be held to be religious discrimination.95 It is notable that
the only circuit to rule against a transgender plaintiff following Price
Waterhouse solely rejected the per se sex discrimination approach and
refrained from answering whether transgender plaintiffs may bring
90. Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080 at 13 (EEOC July 15, 2015) (internal
footnote omitted) (subsequently filed in District Court in the Southern District of Florida
on Oct. 13, 2015).
91. See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the
Price Waterhouse doctrine “does not make Title VII protection against sex stereotyping
conditional or provide any reason to exclude Title VII coverage for non sex-stereotypical
behavior simply because the person is a transsexual.”); see also Glenn v. Brumby, 663
F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding an Equal Protection violation when a govern-
ment agent fired a transgender employee because of gender nonconformity and indicat-
ing the lower threshold for Title VII claims); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214
F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2000) (recognizing a possible Title VII claim for gender identity
under Price Waterhouse in an Equal Credit Opportunity Act case). But see Schwenk v.
Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “under Price Waterhouse,
‘sex’ under Title VII encompasses both sex—that is, the biological differences between
men and women—and gender. Discrimination because one fails to act in the way expected
of a man or woman is forbidden under Title VII.”) (emphasis added).
92. See, e.g., Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012).
93. See, e.g., Holder, supra note 71.
94. See, e.g., Finkle v. Howard County, 12 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788 (D. Md. 2014) (“Plain-
tiff’s claim that she was discriminated against ‘because of her obvious transgendered
status’ is a cognizable claim of sex discrimination under Title VII.”); see also Schroer v.
Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 307–08 (D.D.C. 2008).
95. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
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Title VII claims under the sex-stereotyping approach.96 Title VII’s
protection from gender identity discrimination has been explicitly
recognized or implicitly acknowledged by the First, Sixth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.97
While there is now an emerging consensus that discrimination
based on gender identity is prohibited under Title VII, protections for
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) plaintiffs are unclear and continue
to be inconsistently applied.98 Although circuit courts have universally
held that Congress did not intend to include sexual orientation in Title
VII,99 some courts, consistent with the EEOC’s interpretation,100 have
been willing to protect LGB plaintiffs under the sex-stereotyping ap-
proach.101 However, other courts refuse to engage the sex-stereotyping
approach at all, and instead reject LGBT claims as “bootstrapping”
sexual orientation discrimination to sex discrimination.102
96. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2007) (“This court
need not decide whether discrimination based on an employee’s failure to conform to sex
stereotypes always constitutes discrimination ‘because of sex’ and we need not decide
whether such a claim may extend Title VII protection to transsexuals who act and
appear as a member of the opposite sex. Instead, because we conclude Etsitty has not
presented a genuine issue of material fact as to whether UTA’s stated motivation for her
termination is pretextual, we assume, without deciding, that such a claim is available
and that Etsitty has satisfied her prima facie burden.”).
97. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough for Title
VII, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 715, 766–67 (2014) (analyzing the difference in protection from
courts for LGB plaintiffs that “look gay,” and LGB plaintiffs who are known or suspected
to be gay).
99. DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329–30 (“Congress has not shown
any intent other than to restrict the term ‘sex’ to its traditional meaning . . . . [W]e
conclude that Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ discrimination applies only to discrimination
on the basis of gender and should not be judicially extended to include sexual preference
such as homosexuality.”); see also Medina v. Income Support Div., N.M., 413 F.3d 1131,
1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir.
2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp.
& Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 704 (7th Cir. 2000); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194
F.3d 252, 258–59 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143
(4th Cir. 1996);Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989);
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 326–27 (5th Cir. 1978).
100. See Veretto v. Donahoe, Appeal No. 0120110873 (EEOC July 1, 2011) (supporting
the sex-stereotyping approach for a gay man who was harassed by a coworker that had
seen his wedding announcement in the paper).
101. See, e.g., Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3d Cir. 2009);
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[J]ust as a woman can
ground an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did not
meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, . . . a man can ground a claim on evidence
that other men discriminated against him because he did not meet stereotyped ex-
pectations of masculinity.”).
102. Simonton, 232 F.3d at 38 (holding that “[the sex-stereotyping] theory would not
bootstrap protection for sexual orientation into Title VII because not all homosexual men
are stereotypically feminine, and not all heterosexual men are stereotypically masculine,”
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C. Legislative Efforts: From Failed Campaigns to Nascent
Recognition
Although most LGBT protections achieved thus far have been
gained through the courts or executive action, LGBT advocates have
put tremendous energy into federal legislative initiatives and have
succeeded in obtaining some important initial legislative victories,
most notably in the passage of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd,
Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA), the repeal of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell” (DADT), and the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA).
Over a decade after the homophobic and racially motivated mur-
ders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr.,103 Congress passed
the HCPA, which, in addition to extending protections on the basis
of gender and disability, for the first time ever in federal law, ex-
tended protections to include sexual orientation and gender identity,
penalizing anyone who “willfully causes bodily injury” because of a
victim’s “actual or perceived . . . gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability . . . .” 104
In 2013, in reauthorizing the VAWA, Congress for the first time
included sexual orientation and gender identity in VAWA’s cover-
age.105 In doing so, Congress not only provided LGBT non-discrimi-
nation protections for domestic violence services, such as shelters,
but also included sexual orientation and gender identity with other
groups that face barriers in accessing services, known as “under-
served populations,” 106 and increased the ability of the LGBT com-
munity to be protected by states.107
and ultimately rejecting the claim because there was “no basis in the record to surmise that
Simonton behaved in a stereotypically feminine manner and that the harassment he
endured was, in fact, based on his non-conformity with gender norms instead of his sexual
orientation.”); see also Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218–20 (2d Cir. 2005).
103. See Matthew Trout, Federalizing Hate: Constitutional and Practical Limitations
to the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 52 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 131, 137 (2015) (discussing the politics surrounding the passage of the bill).
104. Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-84, Div. E., 123 Stat. 2835, 2839 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2009)).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, gender identity, . . . sexual
orientation, or disability, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity funded in whole or in part
with funds made available under the Violence Against Women Act . . . .”).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 13925(a)(39).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 3796gg(b)(19) (allowing grants for “developing, enlarging, or strength-
ening programs and projects to provide services and responses targeting male and female
victims of domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, whose ability
to access traditional services and responses is affected by their sexual orientation or
gender identity”).
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In the context of military service, under pressure from both the
Obama administration,108 and the courts,109 Congress repealed DADT,
the military policy that, although initially intended as a compromise
to allow LGB individuals to serve in the military, had the practical ef-
fect of banning these individuals from serving.110 While the repeal
of DADT allowed individuals to serve openly and was a significant
win for LGB service members, transgender individuals were still ef-
fectively banned from service,111 though it is expected that that will
soon change as well.112
While these successes are noteworthy and groundbreaking, the
paramount LGBT legislative priority—federal civil rights protections
against employment and other forms of discrimination—is a fight
that has been taking place for decades,113 and has yet to be realized.
1. LGBT-Focused Legislation
Beginning in 1974, LGBT advocates initially sought to amend
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to include sexual orientation, and thus
comprehensively protect LGB individuals from discrimination in
employment, public accommodations and facilities, housing, and
federally assisted programs.114 Introduced as the Equality Act,115 by
Congresswoman Bella S. Abzug, the 1974 bill failed to attract a single
cosponsor and died in committee without a vote.116 For the next
108. See The Military’s Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, supra note 61, at 1801
(describing the passage of the DADT Repeal Act as spurred by successful litigation and
efforts by the Obama administration).
109. See Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 2d 884, 929 (C.D. Cal.
2010), vacated as moot, 658 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (holding DADT
violates the First Amendment).
110. See The Military’s Repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”, supra note 61, at 1795–97
(explaining that due to the vast unreviewable discretion of Commanders to investigate,
as well as aggressive investigatory practices, unequal enforcement, similar outcomes,
and a culture of fear, the policy of DADT was, in effect, the same as an outright ban).
111. DADT’s policies remain in effect for transgender troops. See, e.g., Emma Margolin,
‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Lives On for Transgender Troops, MSNBC (Oct. 22, 2014, 7:54 AM),
http:/ /www.msnbc.com/msnbc/dont-ask-dont-tell-lives-transgender-troops
[http://perma.cc/2DZG-ENXS]; Colin Daileda, For Transgendered Soldiers, Don’t Ask
Don’t Tell Carries On, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 29, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes
/archive/2012/10/for-transgendered-soldiers-don’t-ask-don’t-tell-carries-on/264225
[http://perma.cc/6VTG-MHL3].
112. See Carter, supra note 62.
113. See infra notes 114, 119–49 and accompanying text.
114. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 17, at 281–82 (2014).
115. Equality Act of 1974, H.R. 14,752, 93d Cong. (1974) (proposing the addition of
marital status and sexual orientation as protected classes under the Civil Rights Act, as
well as the prohibition of sex discrimination—not just in employment under Title VII—
but in public accommodations, public facilities, and federally assisted programs under
Titles II, III, and VI, respectively).
116. See, e.g., Alex Reed, A Pro-Trans Argument for a Transexclusive Employment
Non-Discrimination Act, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 835, 838 (2013).
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twenty years, numerous bills were introduced to amend the Civil
Rights Act to protect the gay and lesbian community,117 and although
none of these bills made it past committee, they slowly built support
and gained cosponsors.118
However, in 1994, LGBT advocates shifted strategies, abandon-
ing broad LGB protections in favor of a more politically expedient,
standalone bill drafted around a single issue: employment discrimi-
nation.119 This decision was a result of both the political realities
facing LGBT individuals at the time,120 and the recent passage of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, a model of a freestand-
ing civil rights bill that passed with bipartisan support.121 Seen as
the best option at the time, the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
(ENDA) was introduced in 1994, and by 1996, the Senate version of
ENDA was poised to pass, with advocates counting on Vice President
Al Gore’s deciding vote.122 Although ENDA proponents compromised
to avoid a filibuster and negative amendments from opponents by
allowing a vote, without amendments, on the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA)123—which passed—ultimately ENDA was defeated by
a vote of fifty to forty-nine, when a supporter was unexpectedly
called away.124
Reintroductions of ENDA in 1997,125 1999,126 2001,127 and 2003,128
proved fruitless due to significant changes in the political climate.129
While ENDA was already a low priority issue for the Republican
117. See A History of Federal Non-Discrimination Legislation, HUMAN RIGHTS CAM-
PAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/a-history-of-federal-non-discrimination-legis
lation [http://perma.cc/29FL-CZHB] (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
118. See, e.g., Sung, supra note 18, at 495–514 (2011) (noting the number of cosponsors
for bills amending the CRA grew from zero in 1974 to 110 by 1991 in the House of Rep-
resentatives, and grew from three in 1979 to sixteen in 1991 in the Senate).
119. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 17, at 282.
120. Compare Sung, supra note 18, at 497 (attributing the shift in strategy to the loss
in the fight against “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” the exhaustion of resources on the AIDS epi-
demic, and the passage of the ADA), with Barney Frank, Civil Rights, Legislative Wrongs,
THE ADVOCATE, Feb. 15, 2000, at 9 (attributing the shift in strategy to the increasing
demonization of affirmative action policies in the 1980s).
121. Sung, supra note 18, at 497.
122. See Reed, supra note 17, at 283.
123. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (“[T]he
word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband
and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband
or a wife.”).
124. Sung, supra note 18, at 502.
125. S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997).
126. S. 1276, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999).
127. S. 1284, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. (2001).
128. S. 1705, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003).
129. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 17, at 284.
2015] MARRIED ON SUNDAY, FIRED ON MONDAY 49
Congress that took office beginning in January of 1995, any hope of
ENDA’s passage was defeated with George W. Bush’s election and
the withdrawal of support from prominent advocacy groups over the
lack of transgender protections.130
When the Democrats won both houses of Congress in the 2006
midterm elections, ENDA became a legislative priority, and unlike
its previous versions, included protections for discrimination based
on gender identity.131 But as opposition grew, even among Demo-
crats, the House ultimately passed a bill that excluded protections
for gender identity, and the Senate never took up the bill.132 The
decision to exclude gender identity from the 2007 version of ENDA
greatly divided the LGBT community, and caused nearly 300 LGBT
organizations to oppose the bill.133
As a solution to this tension, the LGBT community coalesced
around a gender-identity inclusive ENDA and each subsequent ver-
sion of ENDA has included protections for gender identity.134 Both
the 2009 and 2011 versions of ENDA included gender identity, and
both died in committee.135 And while the Senate passed a gender
identity inclusive ENDA in 2013,136 the bill died in the House.137
But advocates had other reasons to be concerned about the
scope of ENDA, including the failure to include voluntary affirma-
tive action plans or disparate impact claims, and the ever expanding
religious exemptions.138 Even the earliest versions of ENDA explic-
itly precluded voluntary affirmative action plans—temporary plans
adopted by employers to remedy imbalances in traditionally segre-
gated jobs139—and disparate impact claims—challenges to facially
neutral policies that have a discriminatory effect, regardless of
130. Id.; see also Shannon H. Tan, Note, When Steve is Fired for Becoming Susan: Why
Courts and Legislators Need to Protect Transgender Employees from Discrimination, 37
STETSON L. REV. 579, 605 (2008) (noting various LGBT organizations that stopped
supporting ENDA because it was not transgender-inclusive).
131. Reed, supra note 17, at 284–85; see H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (2007).
132. Reed, supra note 17, at 285.
133. See United Opposition to Sexual Orientation Only Non-Discrimination Legislation,
UNITED ENDA, Oct. 2007, http://www.thetaskforce.org/static_html/enda07/tools/united
_enda_materials_1.pdf [http://perma.cc/U6K9-HS9V].
134. Reed, supra note 17, at 285.
135. Id.
136. S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013).
137. Reed, supra note 17, at 314.
138. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 17, at 294; Sung, supra note 18, at 508–11.
139. Reed, supra note 17, at 301; see S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(f) (2013); S. 811, 112th
Cong. § 4(f) (2011); S. 1584, 111th Cong. § 4(f) (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 4(f)
(2007); S. 1705, 108th Cong. § 8 (2003); S. 1284, 107th Cong. § 8 (2001); S. 1276, 106th
Cong. § 8 (1999); S. 869, 105th Cong. § 8 (1997); S. 932, 104th Cong. § 7 (1995); S. 2238,
103d Cong. § 6 (1994).
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intent.140 Perhaps the greatest fear, however, was the increasingly
broad religious exemptions.141
While the first version of ENDA, in 1994, did include an exemp-
tion, it also prohibited sexual orientation discrimination by religious
organizations related to their for-profit activities, without exception.142
But by 2007, ENDA included “three broad exemptions for religious
groups,” which became even broader during its passage.143 In compari-
son to Title VII, which allows religious organizations to discriminate
only on the basis of religion,144 ENDA, without restriction, exempted
from coverage any “corporation, association, educational institution,
or society that is exempt from the religious discrimination provisions
of [T]itle VII.” 145
This broad exemption worried many, and the death knell for
ENDA came in the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc.146 In that case, the Court extended the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)147 to cover “closely held” for-
profit corporations, effectively allowing such companies to use reli-
gion as a basis to discriminate.148 Fearing that this extension could
be used to justify discrimination against LGBT individuals based on
religious objections to homosexuality, numerous LGBT advocates
and allies pulled their support for ENDA and indicated that any
protections sought for LGBT individuals would have to address the
implications of Hobby Lobby moving forward.149
140. Reed, supra note 17, at 295; see S. 815, 113th Cong. § 4(g) (2013); S. 811, 112th
Cong. § 4(g) (2011); S. 1584, 111th Cong. § 4(g) (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 4(g)
(2007); S. 1705, 108th Cong. § 4(f) (2003); S. 1284, 107th Cong. § 4(f) (2001); S. 1276,
106th Cong. § 4(f) (1999); S. 869, 105th Cong. § 7(a) (1997); S. 932, 104th Cong. § 6
(1995); S. 2238, 103d Cong. § 5 (1994).
141. Sung, supra note 18, at 509.
142. Id.
143. Id. Compare H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007), with H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 6
(2007) (enacted).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2006).
145. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. § 6 (2009); S. 1584, 111th Cong. § 6 (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th
Cong. § 6 (2007); accord S. 815, 113th Cong. § 6 (2013); S. 811, 112th Cong. § 6 (2011).
146. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
147. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a–b)) (“Government shall not substan-
tially burden a person’s exercise of religion . . . [unless] it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”).
148. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
149. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA After Hobby
Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014, 4:37 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/post-politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after
-hobby-lobby-decision [http://perma.cc/9JJB-MG7X]; Molly Ball, How Hobby Lobby Split
the Left and Set Back Gay Rights, THE ATLANTIC (July 20, 2014), http://www.theatlantic
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II. APPROACHES FOR ACHIEVING FEDERAL LGBT PROTECTIONS
While civil rights protections for sexual orientation and gender
identity discrimination are increasingly recognized,150 these protec-
tions remain incomplete.151 The LGBT community has a clear goal
and believes the time has come. The question is, how best to achieve
such protections.
This section will examine potential approaches for achieving
federal LGBT protections, both legislative and non-legislative. Based
on the historical examples of civil rights protections, we look at vari-
ous strategies, including an employment-only standalone statute, a
comprehensive standalone statute, and amendments to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964—considering the historical examples of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),152 the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),153 and the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978 (PDA).154 Section A looks at the ADEA and
relevant jurisprudence; Sections B and C do the same for the ADA
and the PDA, respectively. Section D looks at amending The Civil
Rights Act with The Equality Act of 2015. Section E evaluates the
strengths and weaknesses of these legislative approaches. Section F
briefly examines non-legislative alternatives.
A. Stand-Alone Employment Protections: The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
was enacted three years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, “to pro-
mote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and]
to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment.”155 This stated purpose
reflects Congress’ decision in 1964 to exclude age discrimination pro-
tections from Title VII and instead direct the Secretary of Labor to
.com/politics/archive/2014/07/how-hobby-lobby-split-the-left-and-set-back-gay-rights
/374721/ [http://perma.cc/M6ZG-RKTY].
150. See Hendricks, supra note 40, at 212–16; see also Sung, supra note 18, at 524–27
(discussing the history of congressional “willingness to redefine and expand Title VII’s
existing protections as long as no new classes are added.”).
151. See Hendricks, supra note 40, at 209–10.
152. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 603 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623).
153. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101).
154. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)).
155. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
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conduct a study on “arbitrary” age discrimination,156 in recognition
of the fact that there are legitimate as well as invidious reasons for
employment decisions based on age.157 In response to that study,158
and the resulting proposed legislation,159 Congress held extensive
House and Senate hearings and ultimately passed the ADEA.160
The ADEA protects employees and job applicants over the age
of forty161 from age discrimination by employers that have twenty or
more employees.162 Specifically, the ADEA made it unlawful for em-
ployers “to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, be-
cause of such individual’s age . . . .” 163 This provision is identical to
the language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.164 However, unlike
Title VII, the ADEA allows employers to take “otherwise prohibited”
employment actions when “the differentiation is based on reason-
able factors other than age,” known as the “RFOA” provision, which
operates to limit the coverage and effect of the ADEA.165
Perhaps unsurprisingly, due to the similarity of statutory lan-
guage and the origins of the ADEA, the jurisprudence and doctrine
of the ADEA and Title VII have developed jointly.166 However, while
the Court may have a presumption that, due to the similar language
and timing of the statutes, Congress intended the same meaning in
both,167 there has been considerable confusion over the interaction
between the statutes and considerable differences have developed
in the case law and doctrine.168
156. SEC’Y OF LABOR, REP. ON THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT (1965), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. EQUAL EMP ’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOY-
MENT ACT 16, 17 (1981).
157. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2596–99, 9911–13, 13,490–92 (detailing the proposed and re-
jected amendments to protect older workers in Title VII). See also Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 585–86 (2004).
158. SEC’Y OF LABOR, supra note 156, at 19–22.
159. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601 § 606, 80 Stat. 845
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14) (directing the Secretary of Labor to provide Congress
legislative recommendations to curb age discrimination).
160. See Cline, 540 U.S. at 586–88 (reviewing the legislative history of the ADEA).
161. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2012) (“The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to
individuals who are at least 40 years of age.”).
162. Id. § 630(b) (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . .”).
163. Id. § 623(a)(2).
164. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005).
165. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1); see Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
166. Eglit, supra note 42, at 1100–01.
167. Smith, 544 U.S. at 233.
168. Eglit, supra note 42, at 1101–02 n.36.
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This is partly due to the standalone nature of the ADEA, and is
illustrated most clearly by the evolution of disparate impact claims
under the ADEA. In the 1993 case, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, the
Supreme Court declined to rule on whether disparate impact claims
were proper under the ADEA.169 For the next twelve years, there was
a split in federal circuit courts over whether disparate impact claims
were available under the ADEA.170 Until 2005, a majority of federal
circuit courts rejected disparate impact theory under the ADEA,171
based on the express reservation in Hazen Paper Co., the RFOA pro-
vision and the lack of similar policy justifications for age discrimina-
tion as for other forms of discrimination.172 Finally, in 2005, the Court
weighed in and allowed disparate impact claims under the ADEA in
Smith v. City of Jackson.173
However, further confusion over the interaction between the
statutes was created when Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of
1991, amending Title VII in response to Supreme Court decisions
that had limited claims under it.174 Thus, because the ADEA, as a
standalone bill, was not amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Court also held in Smith that the standard of proof enunciated in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio175 is still applied to the ADEA,
169. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609–10 (1993) (contrasting disparate
treatment and disparate impact jurisprudence).
170. Kelli A. Webb, Note, Learning How to Stand on Its Own: Will the Supreme Court’s
Attempt to Distinguish the ADEA from Title VII Save Employers from Increased Litigation?,
66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1375, 1377 (2005) (explaining that the First, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits questioned, or outright denied, the viability of ADEA disparate
impact claims, while the Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits allowed such claims).
171. Compare Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 56 (2d Cir. 2004)
(explaining that “under principles of stare decisis, [the] Court was obligated to hold that
ADEA allowed disparate impact claims”), Lewis v. Aerospace Cmty. Credit Union, 114
F.3d 745, 750 (8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing “the viability of [disparate impact] claims under
the ADEA”), and Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000) (allowing
disparate impact claims), with Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2003),
Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001), Mullin v. Raytheon
Co., 164 F.3d 696, 706 (1st Cir. 1999), DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719,
732–33 (3d Cir. 1995), Hiatt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 65 F.3d 838, 842–43 (10th Cir. 1995), and
Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.
1994) (rejecting ADEA disparate impact claims).
172. See Smith, 351 F.3d at 199 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544 U.S. 228
(2005).
173. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
174. Eglit, supra note 42, at 1101–02 (explaining that the passage of the CRA of 1991,
overturning four Supreme Court decisions that adversely affected Title VII plaintiffs—
including Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), and Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)—complicated future interpretations of the ADEA).
175. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657–58 (1989) (holding that to
prove Title VII disparate impact claims, the employee is responsible for identifying the
specific employment practices that cause the disparity), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Smith v. City
of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005).
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even though it no longer applies to Title VII.176 Thus, although the
Court allowed disparate impact claims under the ADEA, the Court
imposed a higher standard of proof for ADEA claims than for Title
VII claims, and “narrowly construed the employer’s exposure to lia-
bility on a disparate-impact theory.” 177 The distinction between the
ADEA and Title VII has broad implications for future claims.178
Another complication arising from the complex interaction
between the ADEA, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, came
from the Court’s holding in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
that mixed-motive cases are never proper under the ADEA.179 Fol-
lowing Gross, an ADEA plaintiff must prove that, “but for” the
consideration of his or her age, the employer would not have made
the employment decision.180 This is in contrast to a Title VII claim,
where the burden of proof shifts to the employer upon a showing that
the prohibited reason—race, color, religion, sex, or national origin—
was a “motivating factor,” even if other factors also motivated the
decision.181 As “[p]roving discriminatory intent is not easy for plain-
tiffs,” Gross has made it more difficult for ADEA plaintiff’s to bring
successful claims.182 In response to this decision, the Protecting
Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWADA), which at-
tempts to reverse Gross, has been introduced in virtually every
Congress since the Gross decision.183
The LGBT employment protections in ENDA reflected an ap-
proach similar to the ADEA. The potential dangers of narrow court
interpretations, confusing or conflicting interactions with other stat-
utes, and the symbolism inherent in a separate LGBT bill, in addi-
tion to the legislative carve-outs already incorporated in ENDA, may
lead advocates to consider this approach cautiously.184
176. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.
177. Id.
178. Webb, supra note 170, at 1401 (including potentially creating hostile work envi-
ronment claims and claims associated with reductions in force).
179. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009).
180. Id. at 177–78.
181. Id. at 177 n.3; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 257–58 (1989) (using
the McDonnell Douglas framework); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2015) (“[A]n unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment prac-
tice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”). But see Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (finding no mixed motive claims avail-
able in retaliation cases under Title VII).
182. Leigh A. Van Ostrand, Note, A Close Look at ADEA Mixed-Motives Claims and
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 447 (2009).
183. See Press Release, Civil and Human Rights Coalition Applauds Introduction of Bill
to Protect Older Workers From Discrimination, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (Oct. 8,
2015), http://www.civilrights.org/press/2015/POWADA.html [http://perma.cc/PXY8-W6R2].
184. See supra Part I.C.1.
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B. Comprehensive Stand-Alone Legislation: The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
Twenty-five years ago, Congress passed the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA), as the result of a decades-long advocacy
campaign.185 This campaign began with the passage of Section 504
of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act, which banned recipients of federal
funds from discriminating on the basis of disability, and marked the
first time that people with disabilities were recognized as a pro-
tected class.186 Both prior to and after its transformation into an
independent agency in 1984, the National Council on Disability (NCD)
has worked with this campaign and greatly influenced the enact-
ment and continued strengthening of the ADA.187 Starting with its
1986 report, Toward Independence,188 the NDC recommended the
ADA’s enactment, and two years later, in its second report, On the
Threshold of Independence,189 proposed a draft statute that ultimately
became the ADA.190
The final bill was signed into law on July 26, 1990, after pass-
ing overwhelmingly by a 91–6 vote in the Senate, and a 377–28 vote
in the House.191 The legislative history regarding the ADA’s passage
reflects both a widespread and bipartisan congressional desire to
protect people with disabilities from discrimination in all areas of
life, as well as a certain level of homophobia, as Congress quickly
excluded coverage for all sexual minorities and “transvestites.” 192
The ADA is a comprehensive standalone civil rights statute,
intended to be broad in application, yet specific in areas of cover-
age, including employment,193 government programs and services,194
185. Donovan W. Frank & Lisa L. Beane, How the ADA Was Passed, FED. LAW., June
2015, at 62, 63.
186. Id. at 63.
187. Jonathan R. Mook, Celebrating and Reflecting on 20 Years of the Americans with




188. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF
FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFECTING PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES—WITH LEGISLA-
TIVE RECOMMENDATIONS (1986), http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1986/February1986
[http://perma.cc/8Q45-5ZWB].
189. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988),
http://www.ncd.gov/publications/1988/Jan1988 [http://perma.cc/2UEH-GHSL].
190. Mook, supra note 187.
191. Frank & Beane, supra note 185.
192. Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act,
8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 33, 39–40 (2004); Ruth Colker, The ADA’s Journey Through
Congress, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 2 (2004).
193. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2015).
194. Id at §§ 12131–12134.
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transportation,195 private businesses,196 and telecommunications.197
As such, the first stated purpose of the ADA is “to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrim-
ination against individuals with disabilities.” 198
But as a standalone civil rights statute, the ADA has complex
interactions with other federal statutes, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,199
as well as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.200 As a result
of this confusion, and narrow court interpretations, litigation under
the ADA was challenging for plaintiffs.201 The Supreme Court’s nar-
rowing of the definition of “disability,” in a series of cases beginning
in 1999, ultimately resulted in a Congressional override with the
passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act
(ADAAA) in 2008.202
Under the ADA, “disability” is defined as “[a] physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being
regarded as having such an impairment.” 203 Starting with Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., the Court began to ignore legislative history
and the executive agencies tasked with implementing the ADA,204
and held that mitigating measures, such as corrective lenses or a pros-
thetic limb, should be considered in the determination of whether an
individual has a disability.205 Then, in Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky,
195. Id at §§ 12141–12165.
196. Id at §§ 12181–12189.
197. These provisions can be found in both Title IV, and as amendments to the Com-
munications Act of 1934, and are codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611.
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).
199. See Tory L. Lucas, Disabling Complexity: The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 and Its Interaction with Other Federal Laws, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 871, 992 (2005)
(detailing the interaction of the ADA with other federal laws including: the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993, the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Social Security Act of 1935, and the National Labor
Relations Act).
200. See Bryan Joggerst, Note, Reasonable Accommodation of Mixed Motives Claims
Under the ADA: Consistent, Congruent, and Necessary, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1587, 1601–05
(2014) (addressing mixed-motive cases under the ADA in light of the ADAAA and the
Court’s holding in Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), that mixed-motive
claims are improper in ADEA cases).
201. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, RIGHTING THE ADA (2004), http://www.ncd.gov
/publications/2004/Dec12004 [http://perma.cc/66SU-LEKE].
202. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. 12101).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A–C) (2012).
204. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
COURT DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT (2013), http://www.ncd.gov/pub
lications/2013/07232013 [http://perma.cc/Z537-2J2Y].
205. Sutton v. United Airlines Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
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Inc. v. Williams, the Court held that the terms “major life activity”
and “substantially limiting” in the definition of disability “need to
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying
as disabled.” 206 These cases, in addition to procedural and pleading
issues,207 led to an extremely low success rate for ADA plaintiffs,208
and fueled a renewed advocacy campaign for comprehensive protec-
tions against disability discrimination.209
This continued advocacy, in conjunction with the release of
another NCD report, Righting the ADA,210 was the impetus behind
the ADAAA.211 The report analyzed all the Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the ADA since its passage and concluded that because
courts had construed the definition of disability so narrowly, many
people with disabilities intended to be covered under the ADA were no
longer protected.212 It also called for the ADA to be restored, and pro-
posed legislation, which ultimately became the ADAAA, after exten-
sive negotiations with the business community.213 While a preliminary
review of the success of ADA plaintiffs after the ADAAA is promising,
more time is required to determine if the trend will continue.214
Using the ADA as an example, an LGBT comprehensive stand-
alone bill would provide the opportunity for broad, yet tailored pro-
tections. However, potential conflicts with other statutes, and limited,
and confusing interpretations by the courts, may lead to inconsis-
tent protections.
206. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197–98 (2002) (overturned
due to legislative action in the ADAAA).
207. See Eliza Kaiser, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Unfulfilled Promise for
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 735, 744 (2004) (at-
tributing the low success rate for ADA plaintiffs to a number of factors: “(1) the courts’
abuse of the summary judgment device; (2) the courts’ failure to defer to the EEOC’s
guidance; (3) the apparent hostility of some courts, particularly in conservative circuits,
to ADA claims; (4) the EEOC’s infrequent participation in plaintiff’s ADA litigation; and
(5) the Supreme Court’s use of the ADA’s flexible and ambiguous language to narrow the
grounds of recovery . . . .”); see also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 204, at 3
(indicating that inadequate pleadings are still a factor in the low success rate of ADA
plaintiffs, even after the passage of the ADAAA).
208. Kaiser, supra note 207, at 738–41; see Ruth Colker, The Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999); Ruth
Colker, Winning and Losing Under the ADA, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 248–51 (2001).
209. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 201, at 1.
210. See id.
211. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat 3553 (2008).
212. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 204, at 2.
213. Id. at 17–18.
214. Id. at 8 (recognizing “that not enough time has elapsed since the ADAAA took effect
for the drawing of firm and definitive conclusions,” but in “decisions rendered so far, the
ADAAA has made a significant positive difference for plaintiffs”); see also Kaiser, supra
note 207, at 764–65.
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C. Amending Title VII: The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA)215 amended
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in two places. First, the PDA
expanded the definition of sex discrimination to include “pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions.”216 Second, it required that
pregnant women, and women with related conditions “be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 217
Congress introduced the amendments to the Civil Rights Act in
response to the Court’s decisions in Geduldig v. Aiello,218 and Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,219 which together held that pregnancy
discrimination did not constitute sex discrimination.220 The Court
extended its Constitutional reasoning in Geduldig to Title VII and the
prohibition on sex-based discrimination two years later in Gilbert,
a case involving the exclusion of pregnancy in an employer’s insur-
ance plan.221
Similar to the ADA and the ADEA, narrow court interpretations
also plagued the PDA. From failing to find that lactation is “related”
to pregnancy to refusals to infer pregnancy discrimination for cir-
cumstances clearly related to the status of pregnancy, narrow court
interpretations have limited the ability of plaintiffs to bring claims.222
215. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2015)).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974) (rejecting an equal protection challenge
to California’s disability insurance program, which exempted work loss resulting from
pregnancy from coverage).
219. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (extending the reasoning of
Geduldig v. Aiello to Title VII).
220. See, e.g., Hendricks, supra note 40, at 211 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s
initial narrow interpretation of sex discrimination prompted Congress to amend the Civil
Rights Act to include protection against pregnancy discrimination via the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act).
221. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135–36.
222. Joanna L. Grossman, The Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act: Accommodating the
Needs of Pregnant Working Women, JUSTIA: VERDICT (May 11, 2012), https://verdict
.justia.com/2012/05/11/the-pregnant-workers-fairness-act, [http://perma.cc/UPX4-QZ9Z]
(citing EEOC v. Houston Funding II LLC, No. 4:11-CV-2442 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012),
overruled by EEOC v. Houston Funding II LLC, No. 12-20220 (5th Cir. May 30, 2013),
and Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dis-
charge of a pregnant worker the day before her scheduled maternity leave did not prove
intentional discrimination, and that although the employee was frequently late due to
morning sickness, in the absence of better treatment for similarly tardy non-pregnant
employees, there was no pregnancy discrimination)).
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A particularly damaging narrowing of rights has emerged in denial-
of-accommodation cases.223
In 2015, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Young v.
UPS.224 The Supreme Court held that the PDA does not require em-
ployers to provide the same accommodations as those provided for
other workers with comparable physical limitations, unless the plain-
tiff can demonstrate there is a significant burden on the pregnant
worker because the employer accommodates a large percentage of em-
ployees who are not pregnant.225 The ADAAA of 2008 also addressed
the accommodation requirement reasoning that, with the addition
of temporary disabilities to the definition of disability,226 certain preg-
nancy related impairments can be considered protected disabilities
for which employers must provide a reasonable accommodation.227
In response to the confusing and indirect approach to pregnancy
accommodation that has developed around the PDA, an explicit leg-
islative proposal, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, that is both
bipartisan and avoids the complicated interaction with the ADAAA
by adding a provision directly to the PDA, has been proposed in both
houses of Congress.228
Thus, the PDA provides a template for an amendment to Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act. Similar to the PDA, Congress could amend the
definition of sex to include sexual orientation and gender identity.229
Likewise, Congress could also amend Title VII to include sexual orien-
tation and gender identity in the list of protected classes.
However, this approach is not without its drawbacks. First, this
approach lacks the comprehensive protections that the LGBT com-
munity is seeking. Second, as shown above, narrow court interpreta-
tions can plague amendments to the Civil Rights Act, just as they
can to standalone approaches.
223. Grossman, supra note 222.
224. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354–55 (2015).
225. Id.
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ix) (2012) (impairments
lasting fewer than six months can be disabilities).
227. U.S. EQUAL EMP ’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.003, EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUID-
ANCE ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES (2015) http://www.eeoc.gov
/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm [http://perma.cc/ZA2Z-7YZN] (“Although preg-
nancy itself is not an impairment within the meaning of the ADA, and thus is never on
its own a disability, some pregnant workers may have impairments related to their
pregnancies that qualify as disabilities under the ADA, as amended. An impairment’s
cause is not relevant in determining whether the impairment is a disability. Moreover,
under the amended ADA, it is likely that a number of pregnancy-related impairments
that impose work-related restrictions will be substantially limiting, even though they are
only temporary.”).
228. S. 1512, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. (2015).
229. Hendricks, supra note 40, at 210.
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To protect LGBT individuals in other areas, such as public ac-
commodations or housing using this approach, Congress would have
to incrementally amend the Civil Rights Act or relevant law issue
by issue. As discussed below, the dangers of amending the Civil
Rights Act would likely push advocates in favor of a comprehensive
strategy, to eliminate the danger of repeatedly opening the Act.
D. Amending the Civil Rights Act: The Equality Act of 2015
A final potential legislative approach can be found in the Equal-
ity Act, which was introduced in its current form in July 2015.230
Similar to the 1974 bill of the same name, the Equality Act amends
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include sexual orientation as a protected
class.231 In addition, the 2015 Act includes protection based on gen-
der identity, and incorporates sexual orientation and gender identity
into the definition of discrimination on the “basis of sex.” 232 The bill
also closes longstanding loopholes that exclude sex from the prohibi-
tion of discrimination in public accommodations under Title II, and
in federally assisted programs in Title VI.233
This approach would include the LGBT community in a landmark
and well litigated civil rights statute. However, it is difficult to draw
lessons from the past, in part due to historic opposition to amending
the Civil Rights Act, based on concerns surrounding efforts to limit
or remove protections for the currently covered groups. The proposed
amendments would provide expansions and amend definitions, which
may cause confusion in interpretation by the courts.
E. Evaluating Legislative Approaches
We have now identified four legislative approaches to achieving
comprehensive civil rights protections for the LGBT community: (1) an
incremental issue-by-issue standalone approach similar to the ADEA
or ENDA; (2) a comprehensive standalone approach similar to the
ADA; (3) an incremental issue-by-issue amendment to the Civil
Rights Act, similar to the PDA;234 or (4) a comprehensive approach
230. S. 1858, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015).
231. S. 1858 § 2(3); H.R. 3185 § 2(3).
232. S. 1858 § 1101(a)(4).
233. Id. §§ 3, 7; see Dana Beyer, The Equality Act, Part One—Introduction, HUFFING-
TON POST (July 29, 2015, 7:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-beyer/the
-equality-act-part-one_b_7880612.html [http://perma.cc/JT7D-SFDM] (adding sex to 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000(d)).
234. See Hendricks, supra note 40, at 212 (suggesting a “gender amendment” incor-
porating gender identity and sexual orientation into the definition of sex-based discrimi-
nation, just as Congress did with pregnancy in the PDA).
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to amending the Civil Rights Act, similar to the newly introduced
Equality Act, which amends several sections of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in one bill.
1. Scope of Coverage: Incremental v. Comprehensive
The first consideration we evaluate is whether a series of sepa-
rate bills or a one-time comprehensive bill is preferable.
While the ADEA- and ENDA-based approaches were intended
to address employment discrimination in particular, the LGBT com-
munity has indicated a commitment to comprehensive protections
greater than just employment.235 Although the incremental approach
may be more politically feasible, in some ways, simply because it will
progress slowly and cumulatively,236 it could be quite a lengthy pro-
cess, with a need to coordinate efforts to amend and address each
issue (housing, credit, public accommodations, etc.) in subsequent
separate standalone bills in order to achieve comprehensive protec-
tions. Ultimately, the slow process and individual nature of the ap-
proach may lead to inconsistent protections depending upon the issue,
as the wins and losses of LGBT advocates and opponents would accu-
mulate through the years.237 Additionally, legislative pieces intro-
duced over a broad time frame may have differing levels of success
related to changing political tides.
Under this incremental approach, employment protections would
likely be first on the agenda, given that advocates have worked to pass
ENDA for twenty years and that the EEOC has recognized that dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is
covered under Title VII.238 The political battle over religious exemp-
tions in ENDA has already demonstrated that standalone bills may
235. See Rea Carey, Op-ed: Why One of the Biggest LGBT Orgs Has Stopped Sup-
porting ENDA, THE ADVOCATE (July 8, 2014, 12:02 PM), http://www.advocate.com/com
mentary/2014/07/08/op-ed-why-one-biggest-lgbt-orgs-has-stopped-supporting-enda
[http://perma.cc/TF6D-KZFB]; see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Rights Bill Sought for Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.ny
times.com/2014/12/05/us/advocates-seek-civil-rights-bill-for-lesbian-gay-bisexual-and
-transgender-americans.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/7CPD-QZBJ] (noting that LGBT ad-
vocates have adopted a broad approach).
236. See Jennifer Wilson, Note, Horizontal Versus Vertical Compromise in Securing
LGBT Civil Rights, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 139–42 (2008) (distinguishing “horizontal
compromise,” which precludes certain claims from the LGBT agenda, from “vertical com-
promise,” which precludes certain groups, and suggesting that horizontal compromise
is more politically feasible).
237. Id. at 134 (arguing for the necessity of a comprehensive bill to “fill in the gaps”).
238.  Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012); Baldwin v. Foxx,
Appeal No. 0120133080 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
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be vulnerable to compromises and amendments.239 The religious
exemption in the most recent version of ENDA was far broader than
the existing religious exemption in Title VII.240 This, in combination
with the lack of disparate impact claims and voluntary affirmative
action programs in ENDA,241 means that each issue could face the
same or similar carve-outs.242
Similarly, an approach that amends the Civil Rights Act issue
by issue—like the PDA, which only amended Title VII—would likely
prove a lengthy process.243 While existing protections and legal prec-
edents may be incorporated—and overall this strategy may attract
less attention due to the limited scope of each discrete proposal—
this approach may prove less politically expedient, as the problems
associated with opening up the Civil Rights Act, discussed below,
may increase exponentially.244
2. Is It Better To Stand Alone?
As noted above in relation to ENDA, standalone bills may be
drafted to have less extensive protections, whether from the begin-
ning, such as the lack of disparate impact protections or voluntary
affirmative action programs, or to reflect political compromise, such
as the broadening religious exemptions in ENDA.245 Political climate
at the time of drafting, and the variety of supporters and opponents,
all factor into how much compromise is necessary.246 Amending the
Civil Rights Act, on the other hand, may not require the same level
of sacrifices or carve-outs as a standalone bill, partly because of the
significance and history of the Act.247
However, one fear of this approach is that limiting amendments
introduced by opponents may restrict existing protections for cur-
rently covered groups. Further, while amending the Civil Rights Act
provides assurances of existing protections, it is a one-size-fits-all
approach, whereas a standalone bill can be tailored to the specific
239. See Hendricks, supra, note 40, at 209.
240. See Sung, supra note 18, at 509. Compare H.R. 2015, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007), with
H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. § 6 (2007).
241. Reed, supra note 17, at 295, 301.
242. Id. at 310 (noting the religious exemption carve-out).
243. See infra Part II.E.3.
244. See supra Part II.D.
245. Reed, supra note 17, at 295, 301.
246. See Bil Browning, Sweeping Federal LGBT Rights Bill from Senate, House Demo-
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needs of the group it is meant to protect.248 The ADA, for example, was
written as a separate bill in part to go beyond existing protections and
provide specific and wide-ranging civil rights protections for the dis-
ability community.249 In the context of LGBT civil rights protections,
special protections may be needed. For instance, some have raised
the point that sexual orientation and gender identity are not always
visible and identifiable characteristics,250 and in the context of dis-
parate impact litigation, for example, the LGBT community might
want special provisions regarding data collection that account for
specific privacy concerns.251 Further, as explained above, the ap-
proach to sexual orientation and gender identity coverage in the
Equality Act is a sort of belt and suspenders approach—expanding
the definition of sex to encompass sexual orientation and gender iden-
tity and also creating a separate protected category of sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity.252 This unique approach may indicate that a
separate bill may better address the needs of the LGBT community.
But perhaps the most significant difference between a compre-
hensive standalone bill and amending the Civil Rights Act is how
the courts will interpret the protections. In the ADA context, the
Court consistently interpreted the ADA narrowly, leading to lesser
protections in a number of areas.253 The ADEA similarly caused con-
fusion for the plaintiffs and courts, as demonstrated by the twelve-
year uncertainty between Hazan Paper Co. and Smith over whether
disparate impact claims were allowed.254 Thus, if a comprehensive
standalone bill is the approach taken, there is a possibility for more
extensive, and more tailored protections, but also a greater chance
that a court will interpret the standalone nature to be intentional
and apply a different, and often lower, standard.
This scenario has already played out in the context of California’s
non-discrimination employment protections for sexual orientation, and
248. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Why I Wrote the Americans with Disabilities Act,




250. See Todd Brower, Multistable Figures: Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its Effects
on the Experiences of Sexual Minorities in the Courts, 27 PACE L. REV. 141, 144–45 (2007)
(discussing the lack of visibility of sexual orientation).
251. Id. at 149.
252. See supra Part II.D.
253. See supra Part II.B.
254. See discussion supra Part II.A; see also Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604,
609–10 (1993) (noting that the Court had never decided whether a disparate impact theory
of liability was available under the ADEA); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240
(2005) (holding that the disparate impact theory of liability is available under the ADEA).
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ultimately required clarifying amendments to resolve the issues
raised.255 In a case involving a schoolteacher, the trial court dismissed
a harassment claim, reasoning that because of the standalone nature
of the sexual orientation protection, only decisions related to hiring,
firing and promotion were covered in relation to sexual orienta-
tion.256 Ultimately, California added sexual orientation and gender
identity to its general non-discrimination protections.257 An appeals
court retroactively held the amended protections to apply to the
schoolteacher,258 and the school settled for $140,000.259
Another problem with court interpretation is that a court may
or may not incorporate existing Title VII doctrines and protections
into a standalone bill.260 Specifically, the recent EEOC decisions,261
and the various court decisions that have protected LGBT plaintiffs
under Title VII’s prohibition on sex-based discrimination,262 could be
enshrined in Title VII through an amendment to the definition of
sex-based discrimination to include sexual orientation and gender
identity, as proposed in the 2015 Equality Act,263 but may not easily
be imported into a separate, standalone bill. In the face of narrow
court interpretations, advocates have pressed for legislation to clarify
the intended scope.264
Standalone bills have also faced complicated and sometimes
confused interaction with other civil rights statutes. For example,
the ADA has complex interactions with other federal statutes in-
cluding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993,265 and the ADEA, which ultimately can
255. J. Banning Jasiunas, Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a “Separate But Equal” Fed-
eral Statute Adequately Protect Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?,
61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1555, 1555 n.197 (2000).
256. Id. at 1546, 1555 n.200 (citing Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 79 Cal.
App. 4th 1338 (2000)).
257. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(a) (West 2015).
258. Murray, 79 Cal. App. 4th at 1354.
259. California Teacher Settles Sexual Orientation Discrimination Suit with School
District, LAMBDA LEGAL (May 23, 2002), http://www.personproject.org/Alerts/States/Cali
fornia/settlement.html [http://perma.cc/W5DP-M7FG].
260. See Shawn Clancy, Note, The Queer Truth: The Need to Update Title VII to
Include Sexual Orientation, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119, 134 (2011) (suggesting that an
amendment to Title VII incorporating gender and sexual orientation would reflect the
law as it currently stands and remove confusion).
261. Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821 (EEOC Apr. 20, 2012); Baldwin v. Foxx,
Appeal No. 0120133080 (EEOC July 15, 2015).
262. See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
263. S. 1858, 114th Cong. § 9(2) (2015).
264. See Clancy, supra note 260, at 134.
265. See Lucas, supra note 199, at 992 (detailing the interaction of the ADA with other
federal laws including: the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, the Occupational 
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cause confusion and harm plaintiffs while being sorted out.266 The
ADEA, similarly, has complex interactions with Title VII and the
1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act.267 An approach based on a
comprehensive standalone bill may likewise have complex interactions
with existing civil rights statutes, including the Civil Rights Act of
1964.268 Further, as we saw in Gross,269 amendments to one law—in
this case, to the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act—cause con-
fusion and complicated interpretation for other laws.270 Interestingly,
the 1991 Act did not specifically mention retaliation in its motivating
factor provision, causing confusion among lower courts.
[C]ourts could not agree on how to treat retaliation claims after
the 1991 Act. Some courts applied the motivating-factor stan-
dard, allowing plaintiffs to establish liability once they demon-
strated retaliation played a motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. Most courts, however, applied Price Water-
house, finding Title VII liability only when a plaintiff demon-
strated the defendant was motivated at least in part by a retal-
iatory motive, and the defendant could not demonstrate it would
have made the same decision absent the retaliatory motive.271
In University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar,
the Supreme Court considered the question and applied the more
narrow interpretation to the retaliation provisions of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act itself,272 highlighting the complications inherent in
and potential unintended consequences of amendment language,
and the potential impact of court interpretation.273
Another potential pitfall for a comprehensive standalone ap-
proach is that the protections may not apply to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment.274 The Supreme Court has applied civil
rights laws to states under the Fourteenth Amendment for suspect
Safety and Health Act of 1970, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Social Security
Act of 1935, and the National Labor Relations Act).
266. See Joggerst, supra note 200, at 1588.
267. Eglit, supra note 42, at 1101–02.
268. See id. at 1161.
269. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 173–74 (2009).
270. See discussion supra Part II.A.
271. Lawrence D. Rosenthal, A Lack of “Motivation,” or Sound Legal Reasoning? Why
Most Courts Are Not Applying Either Price Waterhouse’s or the 1991 Civil Rights Act’s
Motivating-Factor Analysis to Title VII Retaliation Claims in a Post-Gross World (But
Should), 64 ALA. L. REV. 1067, 1079 (2013).
272. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2544 (2013).
273. Id. at 2547.
274. See, e.g., Clancy, supra note 260, at 135–36; Hendricks, supra note 40, at 214–15.
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classes such as race and sex, but not for other classifications, includ-
ing age and disability.275
Finally, the issue of optics and messaging must be considered.
Inclusion in the iconic Civil Rights Act of 1964 not only garners well
established legal protections and well settled expectations, but it
also puts the group covered on equal footing with others covered by
this historic and paradigmatic law.276 Advocates have noted that by
adding gender identity and sexual orientation to the existing law,
the LGBT community would be seen as incorporated into and pro-
tected by the preeminent civil rights law, getting the same pro-
tections as other marginalized groups: “The time has come for full
federal equality—nothing more, nothing less.” 277 A standalone bill
might separate the LGBT community from other protected classes
from the beginning and create the potential for LGBT individuals
to be subject to different standards.278 By amending the Civil Rights
Act to include LGBT individuals, it equates discrimination based on
sexual orientation and gender identity with discrimination based on
categories like race and national origin, removing any stereotypes
or preconceptions of LGBT individuals as different or other.279
3. Amending The Civil Rights Act of 1964
But while a comprehensive standalone bill may ultimately raise
concerns—in terms of extent of coverage courts will afford it, whether
or not the protections will apply to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment,280 or whether this approach separates the LGBT
community from other protected groups—a significant problem with
amending the Civil Rights Act provides a counter-argument to these
concerns.281 Any attempt to amend the Civil Rights Act will open the
275. See Hendricks, supra note 40, at 214–15. Compare Nevada Dep’t. of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (sex); and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652
(1966) (race), with Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001)
(disability), and Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 63 (2000) (age).
276. See Hendricks, supra note 40, at 215 (noting a separate law is less of a “symbolic
achievement” than for a group to achieve protection under the Civil Rights Act).
277. HRC Staff, HRC Endorses Comprehensive New Legislation that Ensures Full
Federal Equality for LGBT Americans, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN (July 23, 2015), http://
www.hrc.org/blog/entry/hrc-endorses-comprehensive-new-legislation-that-ensures-full
-federal-equali [http://perma.cc/G43N-5JS8] (quoting the statement of Human Rights
Campaign President Chad Griffin).
278. See Clancy, supra note 260, at 135.
279. Id.
280. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (holding that states are not required under the
Fourteenth Amendment to provide accommodations because disabled persons are not a
traditionally suspect class); Clancy, supra note 260, at 135.
281. See Lupu, supra note 49, at 92–100.
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historic bill to the risk of amendments that could limit or restrict
existing protections for all groups covered by the law, not just the
LGBT community.282 Particularly vulnerable issues will likely include
the use of disparate impact—as evidenced by the repeated challenges
to disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act283—and reli-
gious exemptions.284
This fear of limiting amendments was a significant reason that
the ADA was a standalone bill, making it “more palatable to Con-
gress than an amendment to existing civil rights legislation.” 285 The
civil rights community opposed linking disability rights with civil
rights based on the belief that disability rights would be costly and
opening the Civil Rights Act to amendments could weaken existing
protections for women and minorities.286 This was also reflected in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s history, as certain legislators, women’s
groups, and civil rights advocates had concerns about attaching
women’s rights to race-based civil rights protections.287 Some civil
rights groups have already expressed concerns leading up to the
introduction of the Equality Act.288
However, while amending the Civil Rights Act is not without its
drawbacks, this approach, and the Equality Act in particular, may
still be the best option, both in practice—by incorporating the existing
executive and judicial LGBT protections and avoiding the complica-
tions associated with standalone protections—as well as symboli-
cally. For example, in contrast to other standalone bills—such as the
ADEA, where age is sometimes considered relevant to one’s ability
282. See Clancy, supra note 260, at 120 (noting that the Civil Rights Act provided
protection “for individuals of all walks of life”).
283. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2510 (2015); see also Amy Howe, Will the Third Time be the Charm for the Fair Hous-
ing Act and Disparate-Impact Claims? In Plain English, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 6, 2015,
10:19 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/will-the-third-time-be-the-charm-for-the-fair
-housing-act-and-disparate-impact-claims-in-plain-english [http://perma.cc/5HUX-EKLG]
(describing the Texas case as the third time the Supreme Court has granted review of
the issue).
284. See Lupu, supra note 49, at 92–100.
285. Sung, supra note 18, at 497.
286. RUTH O’BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY
IN THE WORKPLACE 114 (2002).
287. Menand, supra note 35.
288. Chris Johnson, Some LGBT Advocates Not On Board With Equality Act, WASH.
BLADE (July 21, 2015, 9:07 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015 /07/21/some-lgbt
-advocates-not-on-board-with-equality-act [http://perma.cc/CL3J-JTWQ]; Heather Cronk
& Angela Peoples, Op-ed: Oregon Senator’s Plan for Full LGBT Equality Is Not the Right
Path, THE ADVOCATE (June 25, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.advocate.com/commentary
/2015/06/25/op-ed-oregon-senators-plan-full-lgbt-equality-not-right-path [http://perma.cc
/9ZTF-JMLL].
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in employment,289 and the ADA, where the need to provide reasonable
accommodations is often specific to the disability community—a per-
son’s sexual orientation or gender identity is irrelevant to their ability
to do the job.290 Because sexual orientation and gender identity are as
irrelevant to employment as race, sex, national origin and religion,
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act may be the only way to ensure
both symbolically, as well as in practice, that LGBT individuals are
afforded the same protections as other similarly situated groups.
While there are pitfalls to a comprehensive standalone approach,
they may be preferable to threatening one of the most significant
pieces of civil rights legislation in this nation’s history. For the
moment, however, amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the ap-
proach that Congress is considering, in the form of the Equality Act.
F. Non-Legislative Approaches to Federal LGBT Civil
Rights Protections
An alternative to a legislative solution, and perhaps a more likely
scenario in the short term, considering the improbability of the Equal-
ity Act moving in the current Congress,291 would be a judicial approach
to extending equal treatment under the law to LGBT individuals.
Some have argued that courts are a limited tool in the efforts for
social change,292 especially in the debate over marriage equality, but
it is clear that achieving marriage equality through the courts was an
intentional, calculated and ultimately successful strategy.293 Mary
289. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587, 587 n.2 (2004)
(describing age discrimination as “one different in kind from discrimination on account
of race” and further explaining that “[e]mployment discrimination because of race is
identified . . . with . . . feelings about people entirely unrelated to their ability to do the
job. There is no significant discrimination of this kind so far as older workers are
concerned. The most closely related kind of discrimination in the non-employment of
older workers involves their rejection because of assumptions about the effect of age on
their ability to do a job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions.”) (emphasis
and omissions in original) (citation omitted).
290. See ERICA HOWARD, THE EU RACE DIRECTIVE: DEVELOPING THE PROTECTION
AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE EU 96–97 (2009).
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Rights Bill, SLATE (July 21, 2015, 4:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/07
/21/equality_act_democrats_in_congress_announce_lgbt_rights_bill.html [http://perma.cc
/ZRE3-ZJSZ].
292. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 338 (2d ed. 2008).
293. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Mary L. Bonauto, Supreme
Court’s Marriage Equality Decision Should Energize Us, BOSTON GLOBE (June 26, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2015/06/26/supreme-court-and-same-sex-marriage
-the-equality-revolution-started-massachusetts/4CsQK6JiOi9tb4xRWsEXXI/story.html
[http://perma.cc/2ET9-RTAQ]; Leachman, supra note 13, at 1669–71 (providing a com-
prehensive overview of the success and intention of the litigation strategy).
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Bonauto, the Civil Rights Project Director at Gay & Lesbian Advo-
cates & Defenders (GLAD), who argued both the first case to declare
a state same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional in perpetuity,294 and
the last case to declare all state same-sex marriage bans unconstitu-
tional,295 was one of the lead strategists of this largely successful
judicial approach.296
The marriage equality campaign, won primarily through the
courts, may make sense as a model. Employment protections for LGBT
individuals are beginning to, and likely will continue to, be won in
the courts.297 It is expected that courts will continue to apply and
extend the sex-discrimination provision of Title VII to cover sexual
orientation and gender identity discrimination, especially in light of
the EEOC decisions.298 If the LGBT advocacy community were to
chart out a comprehensive judicial strategy, similar to its campaign
around marriage equality, the likelihood of such a prospect would
be even greater.299 However, as different courts of appeals consider
the question, the protections gained may be inconsistent. And the
strategy of creating judicial protections for sexual orientation and
gender identity under protections for “sex” discrimination is neces-
sarily limited to statutes which protect against sex discrimination,300
and extending these gains to other titles would be unlikely where
“sex” is not protected.301 Thus, this judicial strategy would need to
be combined with a legislative campaign to insert “sex” as a pro-
tected category into the other titles of the Civil Rights Act. Even if
this legislative update were successfully accomplished, and “sex”
was added to the remaining sections of the Civil Rights Act, advo-
cates might then need to craft a judicial campaign for each title,
establishing that sexual orientation and gender identity are included
in the definition of sex.
294. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (holding that
the Massachusetts law prohibiting the issuing of marriage licenses to same-sex couples
violated the state Constitution by failing the rational basis test under both the due
process and equal protection prongs).
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Appeal No. 0120133080 (EEOC July 15, 2015); Reed, supra note 17, at 314 (“Courts and
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As we learned from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Gross, and
Nassar, however, amending legislation may lead to confused and un-
intended results.302 The fact that the Equality Act provides two ways
to protect sexual orientation and gender identity—along with adding
sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes them-
selves, the Act would explicitly define sex to include sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity—could lead to confusion over which claims
are being brought and how they are evaluated. Further, additional
complications could arise from court interpretations around the addi-
tion of sex to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where it
was excluded.303
Another, and perhaps complementary, judicial strategy would
involve an approach to get the Supreme Court to grant or clarify a
heightened level of scrutiny for the LGBT community.304 The appro-
priate level of scrutiny to be applied to LGBT individuals is cur-
rently unresolved, but if the Court were to recognize a higher level
of scrutiny for LGBT individuals, legal protections would be easier
to obtain.305
A final proposed strategy revolves around the executive branch,
and the President’s power to issue executive orders. President Obama
has already leveraged the executive branch to extend to LGBT
individuals a variety of protections,306 and should continue to engage
his cabinet to develop creative and meaningful approaches to ex-
tending LGBT protections.307 This strategy is limited only by what
the President is empowered to accomplish via executive order.308
CONCLUSION
LGBT individuals have slowly and incrementally been gaining
federal recognition and protections over the past few decades. While
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the courts, societal attitudes and executive actions have all advanced
LGBT rights, legislative recognition of federal LGBT civil rights
protections have thus far proven elusive, despite decades of legisla-
tive advocacy.
In June of 2015, a comprehensive civil rights bill, which amended
several titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was introduced.309
While it provides sweeping protections for LGBT individuals, the bill
is only supported by Democrats, is not currently fully endorsed by
the entire civil rights community, and is unlikely to be brought up
in either chamber of Congress in the foreseeable term.310
This approach may motivate the base of LGBT advocates, but
it does create some fears about the security of the Civil Rights Act
among some in the civil rights community, and it does raise ques-
tions about what type of unintended consequences could result from
the proposed changes.
While advocates work internally to devise a path toward pas-
sage, it may be that the courts turn out to be the place where changes
get made.
309. Johnson, supra note 288.
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